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Abstract: The power of words — on how the definitions of crimes in international criminal 
law lie at the crossroads of semiotics and manifest evil
Legal language is paradoxical: it is both open to interpretation and strict, often broad 
in meaning and specific in semantic content at the same time. Moreover, the legal language 
of criminal law is a reflection of axiological and moral values and assessments. The paper 
embraces that paradox and discusses two issues that stem from it in relation to international 
criminal law: the semantic challenges inherent in legal language pertaining to atrocity crimes 
and the entwined evolution of their criminal legal definitions. Its outset is the realization, that 
while the application of law by a court is predominantly an linguistic exercise, it must also 
provide specific, clear and axiologically sound solutions, absolutely necessary in the process of 
ascertaining the criminal responsibility of the individual. This phenomenon is especially evi-
dent in the legal language relating to international crimes, as it faces not only the challenge of 
being a strict definition of a crime, and thus bound to be clear and precise; it also must contend 
with the need to express manifest evil, as international crimes are often and rightly viewed as 
being singular in their heinousness. In eight parts, this article strives to present the challenges 
and evolution of the aforementioned issues.
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Outlining the notion 
There is something captivating in the relation between semantics and the 
law. In reality, a lawyer’s work is primarily based on the perpetual discovery 
of word designation, the logic and syntax of language, and the systemic rela-
tions between linguistic intuition and legally prescribed meaning. This phe-
nomenon is present in every legal discipline, and in fact it permeates much 
of modern legal philosophy, whether positivist, naturalist, or critical legal 
analyst.1 Yet an overwhelming emotional and semantic value is prescribed 
by legal sciences to some terms more than others, and that mode applies 
primarily to the definitions of crimes utilized by international criminal law. 
Each concept defined therein — war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes 
against peace, and most certainly genocide — evokes strong emotional 
responses, injects the recipient with powerful imagery and their commission 
is thought to be the ultimate stigma.2 In essence, the very names given to the 
most severe of crimes induce a perlocutionary effect in their recipient. And 
while their semantic impact in common speech is profound, one must be 
mindful that their academically (by both legal and social sciences) prescribed 
meanings are obfuscated and controversial. This article strives to present an 
outline of their definitions and a few problems contained therein, as well as 
illuminating an overarching theme present in international law.
The challenge of expressing manifest evil in normative terms 
While common criminal acts are often viewed as shocking and trauma-
tizing, they can never be truly compared to the heinous offences committed 
during armed conflict, ethnic cleansing, and illicit warfare. Man’s capacity 
for evil realizes itself fully in acts designated as “international crimes,” and 
yet international law only recently arrived at some semblance of meaning in 
their definitions. It is the case because such acts are as old as the world itself 
and their commission violates essential human values in breach of the prin-
1 See: H.L.A. hArT: The Concept of Law. 3rd Edition. Oxford 2012, pp. 13—14, 124—
131; R. dworKin: Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard 1979, pp. viii—ix, 1—13; J. nowA-
cki, z. toBoR: Wstęp do prawoznawstwa. Kraków 2002, pp. 222—226; T. SPyrA: Granice 
wykładni prawa: Znaczenie językowe tekstu prawnego jako granica wykładni. Warszawa 
2007, pp. 179—184.
2 M.A. drumBl: Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. Cambridge 2007, 
pp. 182—187.
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ciples of international humanitarian law and fundamental opposition to basic 
human rights.3 Only recently has law, and specifically criminal law, become 
capable of expressing such evil in normative terms. Atrocities of the Boer 
War, the Herero Genocide of 1905, the Balkan Wars, and World War I and II 
should be treated as impulses which influenced the international commu-
nity and compelled the latter to adopt a series of legislative acts and found 
the institutions intended to counteract those extraordinary crimes. In order 
to combat manifestations of mass criminality the international community 
established a dedicated legal branch, new types of crime definitions along 
with the names which proved necessary to describe the unusual acts and 
conduct, i.e. international crimes. Rafał Lemkin, while coining the notion of 
genocide, the most serious of such offences, rightly argued that new concepts 
require new terminology.4 It would be difficult not to agree with his state-
ment since it was only conceptualization and specification of old phenomena 
in terms of legal nomenclature that allowed to intertwine them into a system 
of rules and bans and describe with precision what exactly is permissible in 
the context of an armed conflict. This approach is all the more justified in 
light of the fact that violations of international humanitarian law and inter-
national criminal law are ever more often identified as relating to “systemic 
criminality” or “collective wrongdoing,”5 which calls for the inclusion of 
such a widened and mass characterization in the definitions of respective 
crimes. In addition, these features are generally absent from definitions of 
crimes as prescribed in national criminal law systems, which makes them 
exceptional and points to an extraordinary character and complexity of inter-
national crime definitions.
Thus 20th century legal semiotics needed to adapt to the criminological 
uniqueness of international crimes, to their massive and atrocious character, 
as well as to the ultimate moral stigma linked to their perpetrators. And while 
some scholars propose to utilize general or generic names such as “atrocity 
crimes,” those notions are of no practical legal use, as the law needs a precise 
and differentiated terminology for the purposes of determining international 
and individual responsibility.6
The classification, terminology, and legal definitions relating to interna-
tional crimes have remained controversial until the present day, even though 
3 M. PłAchtA: Międzynarodowy Trybunał Karny. Vol. 1. Kraków 2004, p. 358.
4 R. lemKin: Axis Rule in Occupied: Laws of Occupation — Analysis of Government — 
Proposals for Redress. Washington 1944, p. 79.
5 E. vAn SliedregT: The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law. The Hague 2003, pp. 4—5; M.A. drumBl: Atrocity, Punishment…, 
pp. 3—6, 15, 26—29.
6 D. Scheffer: “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect.” Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 2008, Vol. 40 (1), p. 118.
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they have been present in the legal language of international law since the 
middle of the 20th century.7 For example, in Poland, one highly controver-
sial issue is the legal qualification of the Katyn massacre. This controversy 
relates to an old dispute whether that massacre should be treated as a war 
crime, crime against humanity, or genocide. The Resolution by the Sejm of 
the Republic of Poland of 23 September 2009 commemorating the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939,8 while referring to the vic-
tims and the situation of Middle and Central European countries, reads: The 
organization of the system, the length and scale of the phenomenon attrib-
uted to those crimes, including the Katyn massacre, the features of geno-
cide. One must be aware, that in the Resolution, the Katyn massacre was 
not expressly called genocide. The text merely reads that it bore the features 
of genocide. In a similar vein, the declaration of the Delegation to the EU-
Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee of 11 May 2010, sponsored by 
Polish Members of the European Parliament, accordingly refers to the Katyn 
massacre as a war crime having the character of genocide.9 However, some 
earlier texts took a different and more measured approach. For example, in 
the Resolution by the Senate of the Republic of Poland of 14 September 2007, 
adopted on the 68th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland,10 it was 
pointed out that the Senate: “reminds of that tragic chapter in Polish-Russian 
relations, and rejects the attempts at counterfeiting history, trivializing com-
munist crimes, refusing to call the Katyn massacre genocide.” In another 
resolution by the Senate of the Republic of Poland adopted one year earlier 
on 26 April 2006 commemorating the anniversary of the Katyn massacre,11 it 
was referred to merely as crime, without any additional qualification. In spite 
of some academic opinion to the contrary,12 one would be extremely hard 
pressed to ascertain features of the crime of genocide in the Katyn atrocity. 
However, the legal, historical and political conundrum relating to the correct 
assessment of this one specific event clearly illustrates all of the dangers and 
normative pitfalls present in international criminal law.
The problem of correct nomenclature in relation to international crimes 
has also been encountered in the political debate on the Volhynia massacre. 
 7 T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa i zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości w prawie międzyna-
rodowym. Warszawa 2015, pp. 25—30.
 8 Monitor Polski 2009 r., No. 63, item 831.
 9 [Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-ru/publications.html 
(accessed: 14.03.2015)].
10 Monitor Polski 2007, No. 64, item 723.
11 Monitor Polski 2006, No. 32, item 349.
12 See: K. KArSKi: “The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles by the USSR 
Before and During WWII: An International Legal Study.” Case Western Journal of Interna-
tional Law 2013, Vol. 45 (3).
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The Resolution by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 12 July 2013 com-
memorating the 70th anniversary of the Volhynia crime and paying tribute 
to its victims13 reads: “The organized and mass dimension of the Volhynia 
massacre attributed to it the character of ethnic cleansing with genocide 
features.” It is noteworthy that the crime was reported to have a mass and 
systematic character, two crucial characteristics of all atrocity crimes. At 
the same time, the cited Resolution does not refrain from calling the Vol-
hynia massacre both ethnic cleansing and genocide. The concept of “ethnic 
cleansing,” however, is totally unknown to international criminal legislation 
and does not in itself constitute an autonomous international crime. It is but 
another concept grounded in social sciences that, while extremely useful for 
the purposes of genocide studies and conflict analysis, can be misused to 
warp prescribed legal meanings. Recently, the issue of the Volhynia atrocity 
again resurfaced in the Polish Sejm and amongst heated political debate new 
attempts have been made to label it as genocide.
 Similarly strong international tensions have also been aroused by the 1915 
massacre of Armenians, wherein Turkey is still reluctant to admit that the 
crime had the character of genocide, an evaluation that is both self-evident and 
long-since established academically.14 The European Parliament has on multi-
ple occasions voiced its position in the said issue. Inter alia, in the report of 
28 February 2002,15 the Parliament confirmed its previous stance towards the 
problem, which recognized the massacre of Armenians as genocide, and made 
it clear in the Resolution of 28 September 200516 that the acknowledgement 
of this fact by Turkey is a necessary condition for opening of the negotiations 
concerning the country’s accession to the European Union. The Council of 
Europe took a similar position, by considering, in the written declaration of 
24 April 2001,17 the Turkish admission that the massacre of Armenians consti-
tuted genocide as a prerequisite for development of good relations with Turkey.
13 Monitor Polski 2013, item 606.
14 Among others, see: R. melSon: Revolution and Genocide. On the Origins of the 
Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust. Chicago 1992; V.N. dAdriAn: “The Turkish Military 
Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial 
Cases.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1997, Vol. 11 (1), 1997; idem: “The Armenian Geno-
cide: Review of its Historical, Political, and Legal Aspects.” University of St. Thomas Jour-
nal of Law & Public Policy 2010, Vol. 4 (2).
15 Report on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the European Union’s relations with the South Caucasus, under the partnership 
and cooperation agreements (COM(1999) 272 — C5-0116/1999 — 1999/2119(COS)), EU doc. 
A5-0028/2002, of 28 February 2002.
16 European Parliament resolution on the opening of negotiations with Turkey, EU doc. 
P6 TA(2005)0350, of 28 September 2005.
17 Written Declaration of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 24 
April 2001, doc. 9056.
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Parallel controversies have been raised up to the present day in connec-
tion with the crimes committed in Darfur, which were referred to by the UN 
expert commission as crimes against humanity, and yet a significant group of 
academics described the events as genocide.18
The problems with discerning and naming specific international crimes 
are faced not only by the domains of legal academia, politics, semantics and 
media.19 Even the specialized courts which enforce international criminal law 
must cope with difficulties concerning the distinction and application of the 
existing legislation. In the case of General Radislav Krstic, pertaining to gen-
ocide in Srebrenica in 1995, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY attributed to the 
defendant perpetration of the crime of genocide, however, the Appeals Cham-
ber altered that judgment and attributed to him complicity in the commission 
of the said crime.20 While this verdict may raise questions from a purely dog-
matic point of view, as the change of the crime attributed (complicity) and the 
crime charged (commission) may pose problems when one understands that 
those are two very different forms of criminal liability, the most important 
feature to consider here is that even specialist courts are often at a loss when 
dealing with international crimes and the normatively correct way of gauging 
and punishing individual contribution in their perpetration.
A different problem can be illustrated by the case of Radovan Karadžić, 
examined by the same court, in which, on 19 October 2009, the third modi-
fied indictment was issued, covering, interalia, the count of committing gen-
ocide in locations other than Srebrenica, namely municipalities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Then, in mid-2012, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY passed an 
acquitting judgment, invoking the absence of sufficient evidence for perpe-
tration of the crime in pursuance of Art. 98bis of the ICTY Statute.21 This 
judgment was set aside as a result of appeal lodged by the Prosecutor, and 
the entire case was remanded for re-examination.22 Ultimately the Karadžić 
Case was finalized on the 24 March 2016, when the ICTY Trial Chamber 
18 Among others, see: W.A. SchABAS: “Has Genocide Been Committed in Darfur? The 
State Plan or Policy Element in the Crime of Genocide.” In: The Criminal Law of Genocide. 
International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects. Eds. R. henhAm, P. BehrenS. Ashgate 
2007, p. 39; C. KreSS: “The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent.” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 2005, Vol. 3 (3), pp. 577—578; D. luBAn: “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful 
Name: Lemkin’s Word, and the UN Report.” Chicago Journal of International Law, 2006 
Vol. (7), in extenso.
19 T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa…, p. 25.
20 Respectively, c.f. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Trial Chamber Judgment of 2 August 2001, 
case IT-98-33-T and Prosecutor v. Krstic, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 19 April 2004, case 
IT-98-33-A.
21 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Trial Chamber Judgment of 28 June 2012, case IT-95-5/18-T.
22 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Appeals Chamber Judgment under Art. 98bis of 11 July 2013, 
case IT-9S-SI18-AR98bis.l.
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delivered its judgment in the first instance.23 The defendant was found guilty 
on ten counts, but one count of the indictment was dismissed. The alleged 
act, of which Karadžić was found innocent, was a campaign of persecution 
against Bosnian Muslims in several municipalities. In the eyes of the Prose-
cution, the level of violence and atrocities committed enabled the designation 
of that campaign as “genocide.” The ICTY did not share the Prosecution’s 
opinion. While the specifics, and indeed the question of this part of the judg-
ment being correct or not, are irrelevant for this paper, one must acknowledge 
that the proper distinction and designation of certain international crimes 
proves to be problematic even for the best-equipped international tribunals.
International crimes defined 
The basic term which makes a foundation for all further deliberations, is 
the notion of “international crime.” It may be defined in two ways: 
— As an act prohibited under a penalty, attributable to an individual on the 
basis of fault, and the commission of which directly violates norms of 
international law; i.e. under the conception allowing for the application of 
criminal law principles in international law; 
— As an act contrary to international law and attributable to a state as a type 
of delictum iuris gentium which gives rise to international responsibility 
of the state, whether under the presently abandoned conception of so-
called international “crimes of state” (former Art. 19 of the Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States of 1976) or according to the more modern 
conception of serious violations to peremptory norms of international law 
(Art. 40 and Art. 41 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States of 
2001); i.e. under the conception of international responsibility.
An international crime is, in essence, a specific subtype of a crime, and 
it follows that one must first acknowledge what is generally understood by 
a “crime” to be able to proceed further into legal intricacies.24 In the collo-
quial sense of the word, a crime is a serious offence, e.g. murder, counterfeit-
ing of money or legal tender, human trafficking or kidnapping, which at the 
same time, from the ethical point of view, is deserving of the most severe 
condemnation. The current Polish Criminal Code, while dividing offences 
into crimes (felonies) and misdemeanors, sets out in Art. 7 §2 that: Crime 
23 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Trial Chamber Judgment of 24 March 2016, case 
IT-95-5/18-T.
24 T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa…, pp. 35—41.
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(felony) is a prohibited act subject to penalty of imprisonment of not less 
than 3 years or to a more severe penalty. A similar solution is offered by the 
French Code Pénal, which in Art. 111 No. 1 and Art. 111 No. 2 uses the term 
gravity (gravité) of prohibited acts and, along its lines, differentiates between 
felonies (crimes), misdemeanors (délits) and contraventions (contraventions), 
the criterion between the first two classes being the level of penalty. Also the 
system of US law knows the division into felonies and misdemeanors, and 
the demarcation line is likewise based on the seriousness of the offence. In 
most US states felonies are sanctioned with death penalty or imprisonment 
of no less than one year.25 In consequence, a crime makes an act formally 
qualified by the applicable legislation as a serious offence, which as such 
deserves to be opposed, condemned and combated, and which is subject to 
more severe penalty than lesser offences (American misdemeanors or French 
delits). Reference to the divisions of offences introduced in national crimi-
nal legislations seems necessary and relevant as international criminal law 
is dogmatically based on national studies in criminal law. Besides, domestic 
statutory regimes make one of the most essential elements of international 
criminal law origins, and specific references to legal dogmatics, doctrine and 
rulings can be found in the case-law of international tribunals.26
It is more problematic to make an attempt at formulating the concept 
and definition of an “international crime.” Although it is beyond dispute that 
the basic criterion for distinction of international crimes is their exceptional 
gravity (such crimes encroach on a number of the most important legal inter-
ests and take the form of systematic, repeated actions), references to only 
the severity of criminal sanction as their distinguishing criterion may not 
be sufficient. It should be added, following A. Cassese’s opinion, that, inter-
national crimes are composed of four elements: they make direct violations 
to the norms of public international law (whether enshrined in treaties or 
ordinary); their penalization is to protect the interests and values which are 
crucial for the entire international community; the prohibitions to commit 
them are directly binding on all states and individuals (universal character); 
there is a universal interest in their prosecution and punishing.27 
25 L.J. Siegel: Introduction to Criminal Justice. Belmont 2009, pp. 143—145.
26 A. cASSeSe: International Criminal Law. Oxford 2008, p. 6; r. cryer, h. frimAn, 
d. roBinSon, e. wilmhurST: An introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedu-
re. 2nd Edition Cambridge 2010, pp. 5—6, 11—12; M. BooT: Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity, War Crimes. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court. Antwerpen—Oxford—New York 2002, p. 15; I. BAnKTeKAS, 
S. nASh: International Criminal Law. London 2003, p. 15; c.c. Joyner: International Law in 
the 21st Century. Rowman&Littlefield 2005, p. 134; M. kRólikoWski, P. Wiliński, j. izydoR-
czyk: Podstawy prawa karnego międzynarodowego. Warszawa 2008, pp. 26—29.
27 A. cASSeSe: International Criminal…, p. 12.
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While the understanding of “international crimes,” a more general and 
broader term, is crucial from a legal theory point of view and is supremely 
important for the efficient application of criminal justice, it also serves as an 
important context for the definitions of the crimes themselves.
Because of the absence of a uniform code of international criminal law, 
and specifically the absence of a consolidated general part of that legal branch, 
it would not be possible to exhaustively and decisively construct a catalogue 
of international crimes. Legal sources, including the statutes of internation-
al and internationalized tribunals, provide for highly diversified catalogues 
of international crimes, which means that any proposals of such catalogue 
put forward by the doctrine must involve various combinations of elements 
derived from significantly varying sources of law and definitions, however, 
always with a reference to the conception of peremptory norms of public 
international law. It is argued that among all acts recognized as international 
crimes there are those labeled core international crimes, crimes that occupy 
the top position in the normative hierarchy of international law and that can 
be distinguished by their extraordinary character, gravity, their atrocious 
nature.28 The distinctive criterion of this broader category of international 
crimes is their much more severe character and the need for penalization 
by international law in the light of unwillingness or impossibility to punish 
under national jurisdictions.29 English language literature uses precisely the 
term core international crimes, which covers the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.30 The most essen-
tial contemporary international criminal law instrument, the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court of 1998, determines the catalogue of acts 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction in a way aligned with doctrinal postula-
tions and inclusive of the most severe crimes of international importance: 
— crime of genocide (Art. 6); 
— crimes against humanity (Art. 7); 
— war crimes (Art. 8); 
— crime of aggression (Art. 8bis introduced as of 1 January 2017).
While the acceptance of the notion of core international crimes allows 
some clarity in the subject, another facet of their criminology must be exposed. 
Most international crimes are committed in the context of an armed conflict 
and are at least partially entwined with military operations. Ferencz rightly 
28 T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa…, pp. 38—39; W.N. ferdinAnduSSe: Direct Applica-
tion of International Criminal Law in National Courts. Haga 2006, pp. 177—180.
29 W.A. ShABAS: Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Cambridge 2007, 
p. 83.
30 C.f. e.g. C. dAmgAArd: Individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes. 
Heidelberg 2008, p. 60; W.N. ferdinAnduSSe: Direct Application…, pp. 10—11, 89—126; 
177—207.
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considers that military language, its dictionary and over usage of acronyms 
(the QRFs, ICBMs, OPSECs and OPFORs, as well as COMSATs and DOAs), 
make the language relating to atrocities incomprehensible and diluted.31 And 
yet international crimes are intrinsically linked with war and warfare, though 
not all legal definitions require them to be committed in a time of war. The 
sole exception being war crimes, which must always be committed in a con-
text of an armed conflict. Other core international crimes do not share this 
requirement. Times of war are often thought to breed new moral (or even 
supra-moral) boundaries, a proposition that is rightfully thought of by both 
jurists and philosophers as misguided.32 Nonetheless, the introduction of war 
into the questions of international crimes requires one to not only be mindful 
of the precision and semiotics of language from a legal standpoint, but more-
over to never lose sight of the moral distinction such language envisages. 
However, long before a war erupts or an atrocity is committed, a hateful 
sprite flourishes and adds another layer one must be aware of when discuss-
ing the power of words in the context of international crimes. This particu-
lar phenomenon takes the form of the twisted language of dehumanization, 
words that gnaw constantly on the bones of a perceived enemy, words that 
make the aggressor feel not only permitted, but empowered to violence and 
atrocity — hate speech. While hate speech ultimately precedes international 
crimes, sowing the seeds of genocide and dehumanizing victims in the eyes 
of their future assailants, it takes many forms and should be closely moni-
tored. The relation between hate speech and genocide had long-since been 
established by scholars, who view it as a necessary prerequisite, that dis-
engages the victim group from the whole of society and often the whole of 
humankind.33 However, hate speech is not only a prerequisite to atrocity, and 
it may itself constitute a separate and autonomous crime against humanity, as 
the ICTR held in the famous Media Case.34 In essence, extreme cases of the 
abuse of language will be penalized not only as libel or defamation, but when 
found to contain incitement to national or ethnic hatred will be punishable as 
one of one of the most severe crimes.
31 B.B. FeRencz: A Common Sense Guide to World Peace. Oceana 1985, p. 62.
32 D. luBAn: “War Crimes. The Law of Hell.” In: War. Essays in Political Philosophy. 
Ed. L. mAy. Cambridge 2008, pp. 266—273.
33 F. chAlK, K. JonASSohn: The History and Sociology of Genocide. Yale 1990, p. 28; 
H. fein: Accounting for Genocide. National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the 
Holocaust. Chicago 1979, pp. 4—8; h.t. king jR., B.B. FeRencz, W.R. hARRis: “Origins of 
the Genocide Convention.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2008, No 
40, p. 26.
34 J.m. Allen, g.h. norriS: “Is Genocide Different? Dealing with Hate Speech in a Post 
Genocide Society,” Journal of International Law and International Relations 2011, Vol. 7 (1), 
p. 151—154; G. dellA morTe: “De-Mediatizing the Media Case. Elements of a Critical 
Approach.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2005, Vol. 3 (4), pp. 10—22.
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It must be pointed out that there sadly is no uniform legal definition of 
hate speech, even in international law documents. Instead, legal doctrine pro-
poses the following understanding: hate speech is a written, oral or sym-
bolic utterance which attacks an individual or group of individuals based on 
the criterion of race, ethnic or national origin, religion, language, sex, age, 
disability, external characteristics, sexual orientation or sex identity, social 
status or political conviction. Hate speech may daunt, threaten, degrade, 
offend or reinforce stereotypes and lead to discrimination, or even physical 
violence.35 At the same time, it should be emphasized that hate speech does 
not necessarily have to be confined to verbal conduct, such as insult, defa-
mation, slander, punishable threat, incitement to hatred or violence, denial, 
praise or trivialization of a crime of genocide, crime against humanity, war 
crimes.36
And thus, at the very outset of conceptualizing the ways in which crimi-
nal law deals with atrocity and manifest evil, we arrive at the conclusion 
that no clear definition of atrocity crimes exists and that its very content, 
i.e. which acts are considered to be “international crimes,” is controversial. 
Still, the notion of core international crimes is commonly accepted and seen 
as a useful tool. However, even the definitions of the crimes labeled as “core 
international crimes” are not set in stone, and their semantic content evolves 
and remains ever varied.
War crimes 
It would not be possible to point to a single definition exhausting the 
entire concept of “war crimes,” however, legal science and case-law have 
not experienced many difficulties concerning their usage, and the intuitive, 
linguistic understanding of such phenomena is close to their true designatum. 
It is the case since the law does not use any uniformly understood category 
of a “war crime” just as it simply does not use the category of “crime” but 
a whole catalogue of very specifically defined individual crimes, such as tor-
ture, sexual violence or murder. Most definitely, war crimes display the clos-
est affinity with ordinary crimes known to national criminal laws, however, 
they are characterized by a distinct idiosyncratic trait — the requirement of 
35 A. ŚledzińskA-siMon: “Decyzja ramowa w sprawie zwalczania pewnych form i przeja-
wów rasizmu i ksenofobii jako trudny kompromis wobec mowy nienawiści w Unii Europej-
skiej.” In: Mowa nienawiści a wolność słowa. Aspekty prawne i społeczne. Eds. A. BodnAr, 
A. gliszczyńskA-gRABiAs, R. WieRuszeWski, M. WyRzykoWski. Warszawa 2010, pp. 93—95.
36 Ibidem.
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a link between the perpetrator’s acts and an armed conflict (i.e. the nexus 
between a crime and armed conflict).37 Under the provision of, inter alia, 
Art. 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, one may distinguish four main catego-
ries of war crimes, namely: 
— Serious violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of 
War Victims; 
— Other serious violations to rights and customs of international law which 
are applicable to armed conflicts of international character; 
— In reference to armed conflicts without an international character, serious 
violations to Art. 3, common for the four Geneva conventions; 
— Other serious violations of rights and customs of international law which 
are applicable to armed conflicts without an international character. 
Nevertheless, it must be made clear that definitions of specific war crimes 
(murder, rape, pillage, deprivation of liberty, etc.) do not trigger as much 
controversy as the remaining international offences classified as core inter-
national crimes. Most of them correspond directly to similar offences known 
by national legal systems and are more widely understood. Moreover, war 
crimes as a category of crimes do not require as many specific “interna-
tional” elements as their brethren in the “core international crimes” category.
Crimes against humanity 
M.C. Bassiouni seeks the origins of the concept of “crimes against 
humanity” in the impact of fundamental principles and values of humanism, 
which restricted the admissible conduct of combatants during a war. These 
values were present in each human community, at every stage of mankind’s 
history. According to Bassiouni, in public international law these values are 
expressed to the fullest extent in the Martens Clause.38 An earlier, pioneer-
ing reference to the rights of humanity as a factor motivating restrictions 
with regard to specific types of conduct in wartime can be found in the body 
of the 1868 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight.39 It is pointed out therein that, in 
37 R. cryer, h. frimAn, d. roBinSon, e. wilmhurST: An Introduction to International…, 
p. 279.
38 M.C. BASSiouni: Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law. The Hague 
1999, pp. 44—60.
39 M.C. roBerge: “Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda Over Crimes Against Humanity and Henocide.” International Review of the Red 
Cross 1997, No. 321.
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order to mitigate the scourge of war, it is necessary to impose restrictions on 
the use of certain types of missiles the use of which would defy the rights of 
humenity. The Martens Clause and its antecedents provide evidence for what 
values were accepted by the international community during the formation 
of sources of international criminal law. The earliest usage of the notion was 
found in the communication of governments of the Entente allies of 24 May 
1915.40 The text firmly condemned Turkish crimes against Armenians and for 
the first time in history used the term crimes against humanity and civiliza-
tion in reference to those offences. For the said crimes all members of the 
Turkish government along with its [the government’s — author’s note] agents 
involved in the massacre shall be held liable.41 
It should be indicated that the word “humanity” was used here in rela-
tion to a certain human community rather than a huge amount of people. 
“Humanity” in English, as well as “humanité” in French and “ludzkość” in 
Polish denotes an intangible feature of human nature — humaneness. Conse-
quently, crimes against humanity are crimes against all humans in the world 
and against the fundamental rights of all such individuals. The very collec-
tive name draws attention to the extraordinary, mass and fundamental char-
acter of its penalization.42
The concept of crimes against humanity evolved since 1915 and its cur-
rent shape only to a small extent reminds what was originally contemplated 
under the same label. Pursuant to Art. 7 of the Rome statute of the ICC, crime 
against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack. Next, the said provision offers a list of as many 
as 11 acts qualified as crimes against humanity: murder; extermination; 
enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment; 
torture; rape; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law; 
enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
It is noteworthy that the provision expressly points to the mass and sys-
tematic character of crimes against humanity, and, in the same way, makes 
40 C. dAmgAArd: Individual Criminal Responsibility for Rore International Rrimes. 
Berlin 2008, s. 94; L.S. SungA: Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious 
Human Rights Violations. Dordrecht—Boston—London 1992, p. 42.
41 F.F. mArTin, S.J. SchnABly, r.J. wilSon, J. S. Simon, m. v. TuShneT: International 
Human Rights And Humanitarian Law Treaties, Cases And Analysis. Cambridge 2006, p. 494.
42 Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ed. O. Triff-
Terer. Munich 2008, p. 168.
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a response to the previously signaled mass criminological characteristic of 
atrocity crimes. While the specific acts of an individual perpetrator may be 
singular in nature, they nonetheless must form part of broad phenomenon, in 
which multiple assailants commit numerous crimes. Simply put, a single act 
of a single human may never amount to a crime against humanity.43
Genocide44
A crime without a name, as Winston Churchill characterized genocide, 
was finally named after a couple of years following his memorable speech 
on the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany — modern international law 
refers to that type of atrocity as genocide. The term genocide was coined by 
Rafał Lemkin (1900—1959), a Polish criminal law practitioner and scholar of 
Jewish origin, by combining the Greek word genos (race, tribe) with the Latin 
word cide (derivative of caedere, murdering, killing).45 Lemkin’s formulation 
of the international law definition of the crime of genocide had been pre-
ceded by his proposals to introduce two new international crimes: the crime 
of barbarity and the crime of vandalism. Such a project was announced at the 
V Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law (October 1933, Madrid).46 
According to Lemkin, the international crime of barbarity was to cover 
intentional attacks on an individual as member of a given group understood 
as a collectivity of racial, religious or social character; the crime of vandal-
ism was to be conceived as destruction of cultural and artistic achievements 
of groups of people mentioned above.47 
In the now classical words of Lemkin, genocide was defined in the fol-
lowing way: “By »genocide«, we understand destruction of a nation or an 
ethnic group. This new expression, coined by the author with the intention 
43 T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa…, pp. 204—222.
44 Apart from other cited works, see: T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa…, pp. 257—369; 
idem: “Zbrodnia ludobójstwa w prawie międzynarodowym. Problemy skuteczności i efek-
tywności.” In: Zbrodnia i kara. Ludobójstwo — zbrodnie wojenne — zbrodnie przeciwko 
ludzkości. Eds. W. WAcłAWczyk, k. ŻARnA. Toruń 2011.
45 More on the matter: R. szAWłoWski: „Archiwum dyplomatyczne: Rafał Lemkin 
(1900—1959). Polski prawnik twórcą pojęcia »ludobójstwo«.” Sprawy Międzynarodowe 
2005, nr 2, p. 103 ff.; T. iwAneK: “Zbrodnia ludobójstwa w prawie…”, p. 94.
46 M. KornAT: “Barbarzyństwo wandalizm terroryzm ludobójstwo. O Rafale Lemkinie 
i idei zdefiniowania „zbrodni w obliczu prawa narodów.” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 
2008, No. 3 (43), pp. 86—88.
47 R. lemKin: “Genocide as a Crime Under International Law.” American Journal of 
International Law 1947, Vol. 41 (1), p. 146.
265Tomasz Iwanek: The power of words…
to describe an old practice in its modern form of development, originates 
from the Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (to kill), and, 
accordingly, corresponds in its form to such words as tyrannicide, infanti-
cide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily involve direct 
destruction of a nation, except for situations in which it is accomplished by 
mass murders of all members of that nation. It is rather supposed to denote 
a coordinated plan [combined — author’s note.] of various activities aimed at 
destruction of the fundamental basis of life of national groups with the inten-
tion to annihilate such communities. The aim of such plan would be to dis-
integrate political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, 
religion and economic subsistence of national groups, as well as demolition 
of personal safety, freedom, health, dignity, or even life of their individual 
members. Genocide is directed against national groups as beings, and the 
activities are taken against individuals not in relation to their personal roles 
but as members of the national group.”48 In Lemkin’s opinion, the previously 
used expression mass murder failed to cover the entirety of the loss inflicted 
on human civilization which consisted in the depletion of the cultural con-
tribution attributed to the given unique group of people united by common 
racial, religious or social characteristics.49 Genocide was to consist in the 
destruction of the national pattern of a group falling victim to that crime and 
its subsequent replacement by the national pattern of the aggressors’ group, 
which could take two forms: the victim group remaining in the occupied ter-
ritory or the obtruding group’s colonization.50 
Lemkin’s work was finalized in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations on 9 December 1948. While its normative content was 
groundbreaking in the sense that it introduced genocide as a legal concept, 
enabling the attribution of responsibility, it was not flawless. Indeed, most 
scholarly work pertaining to the crime of genocide focuses on its shortcom-
ings.51 The opportunity to deal with the most glaring problems was wasted 
during the drafting of the Rome Statute.52 No modernization of the 1948 defi-
nition was adopted and Art. 6 of the Rome Statute defines genocide the same 
48 R. lemKin: Axis Rule…, p. 79.
49 R. lemKin: Genocide as a Crime…, p. 147.
50 R. lemKin: Axis Rule…, p. 79.
51 See for example: W.A. SchABAS: Genocide in International Law. Cambridge 2009; 
C. KreSS: “Genocide Under International Law.” International Criminal Law Review 2006, 
Vol. 6 (4); F. KABATSi: “Defining or Diverting Genocide: Changing the Component of Geno-
cide.” International Criminal Law Review 2005, Vol. 5 (3); C. fourneT: The Crime of Destru-
ction and the Law of Genocide. Ashgate 2007.
52 See for example: W.A. SchABAS: “Origins of the Genocide Convention: From Nurem-
berg to Paris.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2008, Vol. 40, p. 46.
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was as the previous convention (indeed, as virtually every other international 
criminal law source), stating that genocide is understood as any of the fol-
lowing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
— killing members of the group;
— causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
— deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
— imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
— forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
In literature, one can constantly encounter opinions indicating a motif of 
impossibility to describe the features and the inexpressibility of the crime of 
genocide, whose commitment is unthinkable, unimaginable and fundamen-
tally contrary to all moral rights.53 Arendt wrote in this spirit, arguing that 
any attempt to tailor Nazi demographic policies to criminal law conceptions 
of murder and persecution may not prove sufficient in the face of the enor-
mity of such crimes, and that any penalty is going to be inadequate.54 This 
perspective is flawed from a legal point of view. It stems from the endless 
fear that labeling genocide in plain language might lead to its trivialization, 
since as far as it is feasible to word unspeakable evil, such evil is capable of 
becoming an ordinary and widespread phenomenon, which does not call for 
any special treatment.55 This is an expression of deep mysticalization of the 
crime of genocide and is derived from the conviction of its axiological, rather 
than ontological, character. A logical consequence of grasping genocide as 
a moral being is the conclusion that from the ontological point of view it is 
categorically and absolutely inadmissible to commit genocide. Such judge-
ment is grounded on objectively existing norms which define genocide as evil 
without any further qualifications or reservations. However, from the prag-
matic (legal, criminological) perspective, the crime of genocide is just as cruel 
and banal as crimes against humanity or war crimes and must be dealt with 
accordingly — that is by the dispassionate application of criminal justice with 
due regard for the principles and guarantees it affords to both the victim (in 
this case often the victims legal successor) and the accused himself. Thus, the 
banality of referring to genocide by the name genocide seems inevitable for 
a lawyer. During the Nuremberg trial, the crime of genocide was referred to 
as “crime which had been so monstrous that it had not been dreamed of in the 
Christian era until the beginnings of Hitlerism, and that the term »genocide« 
53 B. MisztAl: “Protect, but from What? Genocide as a Concept of Moral and Legal Uni-
versalism.” In: Rafał Lemkin. A Hero…, pp. 292—296.
54 J. KlABBerS: “Possible Islands of Predictability: The Legal Thought of Hannah 
Arendt.” Leiden Journal of International Law 2007, Vol. 20 (1), p. 310.
55 C. fourneT: The Crime of Destruction…, pp. 4—5.
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had to be coined in order to define it.”56 As a result, despite the legitimate 
absolute moral judgements condemning genocide, it is necessary to apply the 
term genocide for legal purposes, as it seems only necessary.
Social and historical sciences adopted their own definitions of genocide, 
vastly different from legal ones. Varied characterizations of the crime of 
genocide have been proposed, which not only exist in parallel to the ones 
deriving from legal sciences but frequently serve as the basis for formulat-
ing legal definitions and prove helpful in the successful understanding and 
application of international law provisions. Despite the relation depicted 
above, the difference between the two grasps of the same phenomenon needs 
to be characterized as fundamental. Thus, two separate ideas for the same 
word designata exist in parallel, in two adjacent branches of science. The 
basic dissimilarity between the legal definition of the crime of genocide and 
the other approaches is the emphasis in the latter on such acts intended to 
achieve elimination of the protected group which are not physical in nature.57 
The legal grasp of genocide is frequently criticized in social sciences as too 
narrow, too limited and unable to render in full the scope and scale of the 
phenomenon and completely detached from the original understanding of 
genocide as proposed by R. Lemkin. The synthetically rendered fundamental 
differences between the definitions offered by social and legal scholars boil 
down to:58
— emphasis being put by international law on the specific intention to 
destroy the protected group;
— types of protected groups;
— peculiar extension of the legal definition to acts other than murders of 
members of the group, which contradicts the presumptions made by social 
sciences, which focus precisely on the element of murdering members of 
a group in the physical form of genocide.
Crimes against peace and the crime of aggression 
Lastly, crimes against peace exhibit a special case of semantic evolution 
in international criminal law. The very name, under which this offense is 
56 W.A. SchABAS: Origins of…, p. 42.
57 L. vAn den heriK: “The Schism Between the Legal and the Social Concept of Geno-
cide in Light of the Responsibility to Protect.” In: The Criminal Law of Genocide. Interna-
tional, Comparative and Contextual Aspects. Eds. R. henhAm, P. BehrenS. Ashgate 2007, 
pp. 75—76; 93—95.
58 T. iwAneK: Zbrodnia ludobójstwa…, p. 96.
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known, underwent substantial reform. The classic (indeed the first) definition 
of crimes against peace, as enshrined by Art. 6 (a) of the 1945 Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal Charter understood them as the ‘planning, 
preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in 
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the fore-
going’. The language used by the IMT Charter was based on the concepts 
introduced in 1928 by the Briand-Kellog Pact, known as The General Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War. However, in the 1950s the language changed and 
crimes against peace morphed into aggression and that in turn ultimately 
took the form of either an act of aggression attributable to a state as an inter-
nationally wrongful act, or a crime of aggression attributable to an individual 
as an international crime under principles of criminal law.59 An important 
historical turning point took place in 1974, when the definition of aggres-
sion was adopted in the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314.60 It must 
be noted that aggression as defined in the previously mentioned acts differs 
semantically from its common meaning. In the language of international law, 
aggression, is not only harmful and overt interference in the affairs of others. 
Instead, it is a war of aggression, or the use of military force in international 
relations. As per Art. 1 of GA res. 3314, aggression is the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. While the semantic dis-
crepancy between the common designation of aggression and the way inter-
national law prescribes its meaning is distinct, it does, however, stem from 
a similar linguistic source and indicates a form of attack. One must bear 
in mind, that aggression is also used in the context of individual criminal 
responsibility and this may cause confusion as to its semantic content. That 
is only exacerbated with the fact, that aggression is rightly understood in 
common language as assault, battery or any form of physical harm, while in 
international law it delineates interstate conflict.
Even though the crime of aggression is of the utmost international con-
cern and was enshrined in the Rome Statute in Art. 5 sec. 1 (d) as a crime 
over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, it was not defined in the Statute 
itself, making it effectively void.61 In 2010 an amendment to the Statute was 
passed, entering into force in 2017, which defines the crime of aggression. 
The adopted Art. 8bis states in sec. 1 that the “crime of aggression” means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
59 R. cryer, h. frimAn, d. roBinSon, e. wilmhurST: An Introduction to International…, 
pp. 313—318.
60 Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, Definition of Aggression.
61 Commentary on the Rome Statute…, p. 135.
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effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Section 
2 in turn states that an “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by 
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations.
This shows that a new term was coined to give name to a crime that was 
already defined and that some individuals were convicted of. The evolution 
of crimes against peace into the crime of aggression must show that modern 
international law puts emphasis on a different facet of the same conduct. 
While the name and wording of the features of the crime of aggression are 
more in line with the law of international state responsibility (which utilizes 
the term aggression at least since the adoption of UN GA resolution 3314) 
it might also confuse criminal lawyers and laymen who may often wrongly 
understand aggression as equal to assault or battery.
In lieu of a summary 
International criminal law faces a daunting task. Not only is it responsi-
ble for expressing the prohibitions of committing heinous acts in a norma-
tive, general and abstract way, but it is also set to contend with significant 
discrepancies in lexical and semantic use of language. Distinct differences 
form not only on the line between common and legal language, but the very 
terms, definitions, and notions introduced by legal sciences are in themselves 
controversial and often open to varying degrees of interpretation. The legal 
elements of crimes coalesce and intertwine with hate speech and incitement, 
the perlocutionary and formative acts that either precede or in rare cases 
constitute the commission of international crimes. This again raises the ques-
tion that law, or more accurately — the application of law by a court, is an 
exercise in linguistics and semantics, in discovering a logical and axiologi-
cally sound meaning not only of crimes themselves, but more importantly of 
their constituent elements. And while critical, this challenge is not uniquely 
found in international criminal law, as every other branch of criminal law 
faces the same hurdles. However, in international criminal law the semantics 
of application and morality are thwarted by more than one difficulty. This 
especially applies to “false friends,” homonymous but semantically varied 
terms, existing at the border between legal and common languages, but also 
between international criminal law and domestic criminal law. That is in part 
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caused by the very creation of international criminal law, which is founded 
on transposing to the international level and merging doctrines, institutions 
and concepts derived from domestic criminal law systems.62 Thus a process 
of internationalization of criminal law takes place and creates a relatively 
new discipline, one bound to encounter challenges. Furthermore, two addi-
tional grounds for the development of international criminal law and its lan-
guage can be outlined — international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.63 Bearing that in mind, the century long evolution in the 
definitions of core international crimes seems only justified and necessary. 
Moreover, this leads to the conclusion that the interpretation of international 
criminal law faces possibly more challenges than in other legal disciplines 
and should be exercised with restraint and erudition.
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